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Introduction

How do globalization and temporality relate to one another? This was the question addressed by a 2011 workshop sponsored by Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition (IGHC) at McMaster University. In the past, globalization and temporality have both been characterized as moving forward independently of human volition, carrying all of us along in their flow. Now there are large literatures challenging this view, and showing how globalization and time are constructed and modified by humans. However, with some important exceptions (Harvey 1990, Sassen 2000, Appadurai 2005, Bauman 2000), the literatures on globalization and on temporality have developed separately from one another. It is important to bring these literatures into closer dialogue, because a great many urgent issues in contemporary human affairs involve interactions between temporality and globalization. These range from individual-level questions, such as managing the accelerated pace of everyday life, to large epochal problems, such as climate change, that may not always be readily apprehended, but are no less significant.

The workshop participants, drawing on their backgrounds in a variety of academic disciplines, addressed the relationship between temporality and globalization in a variety of settings. Six of the papers presented at this workshop are gathered in this IGHC Working Paper. The assembled papers, individually and jointly, identify a number of themes of particular relevance to any comprehensive discussion of globalization and time. By way of introduction, it is useful to briefly consider how the most prominent of these themes are addressed by the contributors.

Colonialism and uneven development

A key feature of global temporality is its unevenness: exclusion from the pleasures and anxieties of speed persists, not just in spite of the push to acceleration, but as a condition of it (Bauman 2000). These disparities highlight another aspect of globalization’s temporality—its historicity. The term “globalization” sometimes bears traces of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, an optimistic sense of arrival, following centuries of ideological conflict, on the threshold of universal liberal democracy. A clearer picture emerges in the light of the preceding centuries of European colonialism. Through this process, Western industrial nations secured temporal advantages (economic and technological) by exploiting the land and labour of the colonies. The civilizing project of colonialism
helped to lay the ideological groundwork for this dynamic, via a narrative of history that relegated the non-European world to a condition of both other-worldliness and primordialism.\(^1\) Within this timescape, the colonies are not just backward but out of time, impossible figures, as Homi K. Bhabha puts it, of a “projective past” (1994, 254), never totally assimilable to the linear narrative of world history. O’Brien’s contribution to this Forum demonstrates through the example of the “black swan” metaphor in contemporary risk discourse, the process of temporal framing through which non-European cultures and ecologies are simultaneously excluded and harnessed to projects of exploitative speculation. Temporal disjunctions of a more material character persist, as Rachel Zhou’s contribution on the caregiving experiences of transnationalized Chinese families demonstrates, in structural relations that repeat and extend the development narratives of colonialism: the imperative to “catch up” influences national economic and cultural policies, as well as migration flows towards “faster, higher, stronger” nations. Emphasizing the echoes and continuities of colonialism in these disjunctions, Christopher Breu’s contribution offers ways to theorize the temporality of globalization in “more recursive and less linear ways.” Breu draws on Enrique Dussel’s theorization of “transmodernity,” which explains the persistence and recurrence of earlier forms of production (including slavery, and what David Harvey terms “accumulation by dispossession”) in tension with forces of modernization. The persistence of diverse temporalities underneath dominant modes of late capitalism defines a world that is not homogeneous but, like a rock composed of diverse sediments laid down at different times, “brecciated” (Burgin, quoted in Breu).

**Risk, uncertainty and imagining the future**

Much critical theorizing about globalization concerns how accelerative forces and dynamic circulations are challenging prevailing institutions and established certainties in ways that construct the lived present as subjectively precarious and the future as radically—and perhaps catastrophically—uncertain (see Beck 2008). Accordingly, the imperative to (re-)assert a degree of temporal control through the confrontation of uncertainty and the active governance of the future constitutes an important aspect of the broader socio-political experience of globalization. These themes are explored in a number of the contributions. Liam Stockdale, for instance, critically examines how, in the wake of 9/11, the question of temporal control—specifically, the taming of a potentially catastrophic future—has emerged as perhaps the primary governmental imperative in the global security realm, thus facilitating the rise of an anti-democratic politics that mirrors Agamben’s (2005) notion of the “exception.” Susie O’Brien takes up a similar set of questions in a broader context, using Taleb’s (2007) concept of the “black swan” as a lens through which to problematize the “framework of ‘certain uncertainty’” that underpins the socio-political and cultural logics of the current moment, including the exploitative rationalities of neoliberal capitalism. Addressing these types of questions in a more indirect way, Petra Rethmann’s ethnography of Russia’s “New Left”

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\(^1\) This vision of the world inflected the development of modern academic disciplines such as Anthropology and History, which, in different ways, simultaneously incorporate non-Western cultures and disenfranchise them by, defining them as belated inclusions in the global narrative of progress. See Fabian (1983) and Chakrabarty (2000).
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Temporality, globalization and transnational governance

Temporality is also significant for transnational governance. The measurement of time itself, with its clocks, schedules, and benchmarks, is a form of governance. Governance is usually designed to lock in certain practices over time. When time accelerates, this becomes more challenging, and older forms of governance, such as formal international law—as noted by Tony Porter in his contribution—or traditional family structures—as discussed by Zhou—may be replaced by newer transnational ones involving more informal norms and expectations. However, as Porter notes, the weight of the past, in the form of path dependence, remains important even in informal transnational governance. The coexistence of different temporalities can also pose challenges for transnational governance. As the safeguarding of tradition—exemplified by customary international law—shifts to the transnational governance of an uncertain future, there is more reliance on risk models, as discussed above. Ultimately, transnational governance involves power. Acceleration and slowness can create or be created by power differentials. Breu argues that the power over life and death—biopolitics and thanatopolitics—involves an ongoing mixture of governance practices from the past, the present, the global north and the global south. At the same time, temporality may be used strategically by certain actors to resist the power of others.

Lived experiences, autonomy and capacities to resist

It appears clear that time as a social construct has been primarily influenced by various dominant forces, such as the global capitalist market, free trade agreements, and popular discourses. Examination of day-to-day lives in different geographic, social, economic, cultural and political contexts, however, makes it similarly clear that time is also constantly mediated, managed, and reconstructed by human beings as the authors of their own lives. Focusing on the altered time perspectives of older people with HIV/AIDS in Canada, Charles Furlotte’s contribution suggests that time, in the form of a perceived future, is not individuals’ taken-for-granted possession, but a possibility built on their access to antiretroviral drugs. In other words, their relationships with their futures also reflect peoples’ uneven access to resources that are often socioeconomically and geographically distributed. Zhou’s contribution touches on similar themes by discussing how, in the face of a time deficit resulting from the work-care conflict, Chinese skilled immigrants were able to mobilize informal childcare resources from their transnational families in order to accelerate their own settlement in Canada. Finally, in narrating a late night poetry reading by a group of Russia’s “New
Left,” Rethmann reflects on the relationship between time and politics in a post-socialist context, in which the construction of the future is also determined by imagination about the connections between the present and the past. While acknowledging autonomy and creativity in resisting the dominant neoliberal temporal framework at individual, familial and community levels, all three of these contributions suggests that it is also important to contextualize their differential capacities to counteract the overarching capitalist hegemony and the sustainability of meaningful resistance from below.

To be sure, these four themes only begin to scratch the surface of potential avenues of inquiry into the complex, ever-shifting relationship between globalization and time. Nevertheless, given the relative lack of attention to this issue in the existing scholarly literature, it is our hope that the diverse contributions to this Forum will provide a series of productive departure points for a sustained interrogation of this intellectually fascinating topic.

**Works Cited**


“Time-lag” and Catching Up: Managing Polysemic Temporality in the Context of Immigration

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Globalization processes have profoundly shaped our relationships with space and time. Situating capitalism in time and space, Harvey (1990) understands time primarily as sped-up time due to technological advance and its impacts on a global space that is experiencing accelerated production, accumulation and consumption. The shrinking of the world has also resulted in a shrunken ability to imagine time, however. As capitalism has gone global, time that is measured by economic productivity has gradually become universal, and efficiency has been set up as a standard in this competitive world. The highly integrated global economy has left many less competitive, supposedly “slower,” countries little choice: if they do not catch up, they will be left farther behind.

China’s awareness of the “time-lag” (or temporal gap) between itself and the West (Zhen 2000), and its desire to catch up, are indicated by various slogans of the government since the 1980s, such as, “Linking up with the rail track of the world,” “Time is money, and efficiency is life,” and, “Faster, higher, stronger.” As happened in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1970s, immigration to, and study in, Western countries such as Britain, the US, and Canada, since the 1990s, have become feasible ways for well-off people in mainland China to pursue their dreams in the West or accelerate their family economic development. Pieke (2007), who coined the term “new Chinese migration order,” has pointed out that the new wave of emigration of highly educated professionals, entrepreneurial elites and, even, university students from salaried middle-class families in P. R. China has changed the face of Chinese immigration in the West “beyond recognition.” Since the 1990s P. R. China has become the premier source country of immigrants to Canada (Statistics Canada 2008), and they are often referred to as “highly-educated” or “skilled” immigrants because most of them hold a university degree.

Human migration, as a very autonomous and resilient phenomenon integral to ongoing globalization processes, has challenged and destabilized the traditional spatialities associated with nation-states through such phenomena as border crossing, transnational families (Basch, Schiller and Blanc 1994; Ong 1999), and “diasporic public spheres” (Appadurai 2005). However, the impacts of the global flow of people on time that is primarily understood as an unquestionable linear backdrop to globalization remain unclear. Drawing on the findings of an empirical study (2007-2010) of the transnational caregiving experiences and practices of Chinese skilled immigrant families in Canada, I here present some of my preliminary reflections on the intersections between immigration and
temporalities at meso and micro levels: in particular, I find that while human migration across borders has, to some extent, confirmed the hegemonic neoliberal temporal logics, immigrants’ simultaneous practice of multiple temporalities on a transnational scale also lays a foundation for counteracting such hegemony.

The immigration of those Chinese adults means that multiple tasks and social roles, such as starting a family, school and career, and care, that usually spread throughout different life stages, are squeezed into the constrained time framework in their post-immigration lives. Meanwhile, economic globalization and welfare restructuring have, to different extents, constrained the time individuals have for care and the state’s capacity to deliver its resources (UNDP 1999). Facing the dual pressures of settlement and catching up in a new country, skilled immigrant families, especially the women in them, are struggling with time conflicts and deficits on a daily basis. When the institutional childcare resources are inadequate and market-based care is inaccessible, the childcare burden of women is transferred onto the shoulders of their elderly parents in China in order for the former to have time to work or return to university to get Canadian credentials. Typically, grandparents come to Canada to help with childcare when invited to do so, and the children are sent to China when they are unable to do so.

Given that one’s time is limited, and time for care, especially for children, is less flexible, women’s availability for work and activity in the market depend on the time required for caregiving and family (Maher, Lindsay and Franzway 2008). Chinese seniors’ unpaid transnational caregiving has been important for accelerating children’s settlement in Canada and ensuring the allocation of adequate and quality care time that is important for grandchildren’s healthy growth. From an economic perspective, Chinese seniors’ transnational caregiving practices have played a role in redistributing care resources—including care time that is unpaid, yet has economic value—across generations and countries. From a cultural perspective, “intergenerational love” is often cited as a temporal logic embedded in the cultural norm of reciprocity within a multi-generational family, as illustrated by the following quote by a 60-year-old grandfather in this study:

_We have a word called gedaiqin (intergenerational love): parents pass their love on to their grandchildren as a way to love their own children. This is a Chinese tradition I learned from my parents: they helped me care for my two children, and I was brought up by my grandmother. ... I want to contribute to our children’s and grandchildren’s lives, and this makes me very happy, very proud, and satisfied. ...This is what a family means._

Within the neoliberal context that values cost-effectiveness, employment and economic well-being, however, Chinese traditional cyclical time, which values family culture, intergenerational solidarity, and reciprocal family obligations, is devalued or neglected. While seniors have devoted their post-retirement time to their immigrant children’s families in Canada, the ability of the latter to return the favour—a form of Confucian filial piety—is often compromised by geographic separation, economic constraints, and cultural rupture. When those seniors’ time is subordinated to their
children’s economic survival and their grandchildren’s “better future” in Canada, the traditional
trajectory of aging is also interrupted by the fragmentation of their transnational lives.

Examining the family-based transnational caregiving of Chinese immigrants in Canada from a
temporal perspective contributes to our understanding of the relationship between globalization and
time in several ways. First, it illustrates the impacts on people’s daily lives, in different countries as
well as in transnational spaces, of the economic globalization that values accelerated time and
economic productivity. Internationalized time pressure and the perceived “time lag” between China
and the West have not only motivated Chinese families’ immigration to Canada, but have also shaped
their strategies of family survival, childcare, and long-term socioeconomic development. Compared
with the visibility of the global market, the dominance of neoliberal temporal logic appears relatively
hidden, yet similarly powerful, through, for example, these immigrants’ rationales about life priorities
and their justification of their children’s future.

Second, human migration and the practice of transnational caregiving that transcend national
borders also bring about the clash of different temporalities or temporal logics. The use of culturally
based cyclical time by Chinese immigrant families to cope with the time deficit and anxiety resulting
from conflict between work and care reflects human agency to manage time on individual and familial
levels. Yet the co-existence of Chinese cultural time and neoliberal time does not suggest a neutral
relationship between them but, rather, the temporal inequality at the root of the active self-exploitation
of Chinese grandparents as caregivers and the rupture of the Chinese tradition of reciprocal family
obligations.

Third, despite the diversity of immigrant families’ experiences of time, this paper also
emphasizes the crucial role of structural forces, as well as of the state, in constituting the meanings of
time and individuals’ capacity to mediate time in a transnational context. The practice of Chinese
cultural time through transnational caregiving should be viewed as a matter of these immigrants’
resilience or strategic coping in the contexts of inadequate institutional support (such as childcare),
international socioeconomic inequalities, and perceived uncertainties (or “black swans” as noted by
O’Brien), in the new living environment, but not yet as meaningful resistance to the neoliberal
hegemonic temporal framework. The subordination of cultural tradition to “family time
economy” (Maher, Lindsay and Franzway 2008), and of grandparents’ well-being to that of the
younger generations, also raises questions about social justice in individuals’ life trajectories that have
increasingly become spatially and intergenerationally interwoven and interconnected.

Therefore, I argue that although immigration has been used by these immigrants as a strategy
to accelerate family economic development, their settlement processes in Canada also demonstrate the
temporal logics beyond neoliberalism, which tends to essentialize time as singular, economic-centric
and universal. While polysemic time enables these immigrant families to mobilize resources across
generations and nation-states, the dominance of the neoliberal temporal framework also means that
various inequalities permeate their practices in managing the perceived “time-lag” between China and
Canada.
The ideas presented at this workshop have compelled me to reflect further on the “chronopolitics” (as noted by Porter) embedded in experiences of time and the sustainability of traditional culture, as well as of a child- or future-centred family economic development strategy. To some extent, the polysemic temporality in Chinese immigrants’ lives can also be understood as “brecciatied” temporality that consists of dynamic and recursive events influenced by both the capitalist world-system and biopolitics—that is, political-economic power over human lives (as noted by Breu). As well, Egan’s critical reflection on the notion of sustainability from a historical perspective suggests the need to situate “sustainability” in specific spatial and temporal contexts and to take into account global interconnectedness with regard to such border-crossing phenomena as human migration. Meanwhile, both Furlotte’s exploration of the sense of future of people with HIV/AIDS and Huebener’s examination of temporal discrimination suggest the limits of the present-oriented temporal framework and the importance of power relations (such as unequal access to resources) in shaping individuals’ relationships with the present and the future. Indeed, the long-term, yet uneven, impacts of Chinese grandparents’ transnational caregiving on the futures of members of Chinese immigrant families and on the states (both Canada as the host country and China as the home country) are yet to be observed.

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Works Cited


Too much globalization theory has been organized around a unidirectional and often implicitly, if not explicitly, evolutionist conception of temporality. Within such a framework, globalization becomes all too easily equated with Western and developmentalist notions of capitalist modernization and, most recently, neoliberal conceptions of economic progress. How then to theorize time and temporality in ways that do not replicate this developmentalist logic?

I want to suggest two seemingly unlikely places we can look for ways of theorizing time and temporality in more recursive and less linear ways: contemporary theories of biopolitics and recent reconceptualizations of world-systems theory by Enrique Dussel (2002) and Aníbal Quijano (2008). At first glance, each of these areas seem like odd choices from which to begin to rethink the relationship between time and globalization. If world-systems theory seems overly tied to an evolutionist opposition of the premodern with the modern, a chronology that itself seems to depend on Eurocentric concepts, theories of biopolitics appear temporally confused if not completely indifferent to time and periodization. Yet I think each of these categories can be rethought in relationship to each other in ways that can present recursive and what Victor Burgin terms “brecciated” conceptions of time.

To take just two examples think of the largely linear conception of time that undergirds Arjun Appadurai’s spatially complex account of the different “scapes” that shape contemporary globalization (ideascapes, ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes) in *Modernity at Large* (1996, 27-49) or David Harvey’s conception of time-space compression in *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Harvey 1989, 201-10).

The concept of biopolitics is first articulated by Michel Foucault in *The History of Sexuality Volume One* (1971, 135-59). He further elaborates and complicates the concept in the posthumously published volumes, “Society Must Be Defended” (2003) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2010). While Foucault initially locates biopolitics, which he defines as forms of power that applied directly to “living man, to man-as-living-being,” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (2003, 242), in *The Birth of Biopolitics* he addresses the intimate connection between biopolitics and neoliberalism, which is organized around the direct economic investment and disinvestment in “human capital” (2010, 226). Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Adele Clarke et al., and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri all share this contemporary time frame for the emergence of biopolitics as central to everyday life. For Agamben, biopolitics is defined as the condition of those who live in the state of exception (a state that is increasingly becoming the norm) outside of the protections of sovereignty and as what he terms “bare life” (1997, 1). For Clarke et al (2010), biopolitics shapes the emergence of what they term “biomedicalization” or the transformation of medicine and medical discourse into a regime for maximizing and normalizing the health of certain populations and bodies (in contrast to the old paradigm of treating disease). For Esposito (2008), biopolitics is organized around a dynamic of immunity, with those who are within the immunity circle becoming the locus of biopolitical investment, and those outside the circle being exposed to the workings of thanatopolitics (or the politics of death). Following Foucault’s suggestive remarks about biopolitics and neoliberalism (2010), Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004; 2009) recast biopolitics as an explicitly economic dynamic, with the term biopolitical production, which describes all the forms of communicative, affective, service, and electronic labour that characterize the leading-edges of production in the capitalist world-system. Achille Mbembe defines necropolitics as a form of political power organizing colonial and neocolonial relationships that dictates “who may live and who must die” (2003,11). Being tied to the long history of colonialism, his timeframe is closer to the extended one provided by Foucault.
temporality (1996, 248). Drawing on Freud’s conception of the dream as “piece of breccia composed of various fragments of rock held together by a binding medium, so that the designs that appear on it do not belong to the original rocks imbedded in it.” Burgin conceptualizes time as similarly composite (Freud 1953 vol 15, 181-2). In a brecciated conception of time, then, events do not have a single history, single genesis, or single temporality but are rather spatially and historically recursive, combinatory, interwoven, and dynamic.

World-systems theory is often perceived as the most monolithic of theories of globalization as well as one of the most Eurocentric. It not only posits a globalized and interconnected world, but argues that such a world has been around, at least in incipient form, since Immanuel Wallerstein’s “long sixteenth century,” the emergence of which he locates primarily in Europe (though as he notes in “Americanity as a Concept” coauthored with Aníbal Quijano (1992) the emergence of Europe as the core of the world-system was absolutely dependent upon the emergence of the Americas as its periphery). Yet the large temporal and spatial scale of world systems theory can actually be one of its biggest advantages in working to generate a recursive conception of time. Indeed, given that the dynamics of the world-system emerge, as Giovanni Arrighi (1994) has theorized, in a cyclical and uneven fashion, the understanding of temporality that can be derived from world-systems theory is one in which time itself can be understood as recursively and unevenly experienced by differently situated populations, for example the time lags, jumps, and conflicts that Rachel Zhou describes as experienced by immigrant populations. This is the conception of temporality and its relationship to the world system that emerges from the work of Dussel (2002) and Quijano (2008). Moreover, Dussel’s and Quijano’s accounts differently dislodge Europe as the sole or central actor in the narrative of the formation of the world-system. Dussel posits “transmodernity” as a more inclusive version of modernity and postmodernity. Transmodernity attends to successive waves of modernization and globalization within the long frame of capitalist modernity beginning in the sixteenth century with China and not Europe as at the core of the world-system (it is only with the opium wars and the industrial revolution that Europe emerges as core). Moreover, he theorizes that such waves of modernization do not simply replace or eradicate the forms of culture or production that they encounter. Instead such forms of production persist and are rearticulated in relationship to their encounter with the forces of modernization. Within such a paradigm, all spaces within the globe need to be understood as composite, as made up of different forms of cultural production and different regimes of political-economic organization, ones shaped by and subordinated to the dominant mode of production, but ones that also contain other temporalities and other sites of social praxis within them.

Similarly Quijano argues, as does Ian Baucom in his celebrated Specters of the Atlantic (2005), that racism and slavery are not residual or archaic dimensions of the capitalist world system, as his focus on the structuration of the world system in the Americas reveals, rather they are tied to wage labour and the production of class as a recursive part of capitalism. In the long history of

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4 For Wallerstein’s classic short account of the world system see “The Rise and Future Demise of the Capitalist World-Economy” in The Essential Wallerstein (2000,71-106). This account is nicely complicated by the “Americanity” essay (Wallerstein and Quijano 1992) as well as by other writings by Quijano and Enrique Dussel.
capitalism in the Americas, wage-labour itself was marked as a privilege of whiteness and a
“systematic racial division of labour was imposed” (Quijano 2008, 184). In Quijano’s model, then,
race and various forms of unwaged or slave labour represent what Slavoj Žižek terms the “obscene
underbelly” to the dynamics of wage labour and what Marx theorized as the workings of capitalism
proper (Žižek 2009, 16). As Quijano’s focus on the space of the Americas (in contrast to Wallerstein’s
privileging of Europe) reveals, race and unwaged labour thus are not ancillary to capitalism but core
and recursive aspects of it.

Quijano’s model can thus be aligned with the way in which David Harvey has retheorized
Marx’s conception of “primitive accumulation,” which Marx posited as a forerunner to industrial
capitalism, as what Harvey terms “accumulation by dispossession,” which becomes a regularly
recurring dynamic within the world-system (Harvey 2005, 178). In his theorization the growth of
accumulation by dispossession in neoliberalism and the dynamics of financialization create a
temporality in which the most recent developments within capitalism recall its ostensibly earliest
features.

Such a model can also help us understand and theorize biopolitics and its deathly double,
thanatopolitics, as well as the forms of temporal confusion that have been central to these concepts.
As articulated in the work of thinkers as diverse as Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Roberto
Esposito, Achille Mbembe, Adele Clarke et al, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, both concepts
have become indispensable for theorizing a present in which power works less through citizenship and
abstract statehood and more through the governmental or political-economic organization (biopolitics)
or negation (thanatopolitics) of life itself. Yet biopolitics and thanatopolitics are temporally troubled
concepts. In Foucault’s work biopolitics begins in the eighteenth century, while for Agamben,
Esposito, Clarke et al, and Hardt and Negri it takes on its characteristic mantle only in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries (even as Agamben theorizes it partly through the lens of classical antiquity).
Still, as Mbembe argues, biopolitics and what he terms necropolitics have been with us since the
beginning of European imperialism.

I think Mbembe is correct. It is irresponsible to think about forms of biopolitical and
thanatopolitical governmentality and the production of life and death without confronting the ways in
which such dynamics were central to the workings of European imperialism. Yet it is also true that
more and more of life in the present in spaces of the global north are taking on a decidedly biopolitical
(and at times thanatopolitical) character. Perhaps, biopolitics and thanatopolitics are also recursive
dynamics, ones that like accumulation by dispossession and unwaged work are a recurring dynamic in
the world-system. Indeed, following Esposito’s conception of biopolitics and thanatopolitics as
mutually imbricated dynamics, ones that are structured by the workings of immunity, we might think
about these categories as overlapping with waged labour and unwaged labour. Esposito posits that
biopolitics turns into thanatopolitics when certain populations are located as outside of the sphere of
immunity. While, Esposito, using the Holocaust as his paradigmatic instance, constructs the workings
of immunity along political lines, I want to suggest it can also be theorized in a political-economic
register. Within such a political-economic reworking of Esposito’s paradigm, biopolitics structures the waged spaces of neoliberal accumulation, the spaces explicitly about the distribution of human capital, while thanatopolitics defines those (often racialized) spaces of unwaged labour in which populations are constructed as disposable. Perhaps what we are seeing in the present, then, is the migration of biopolitical and thanatopolitical dynamics that were once primarily confined to the global south to the global north. If my hypothesis in this brief paper is correct and the temporality of the world-system is recursive, then maybe we need to look to other resources and other currents, ones that are part of the submerged yet still present histories that make up Dussel’s transmodernity, for ways out of our current global situation.

Christopher Breu is Associate Professor of English at Illinois State University and author of ‘Hard-Boiled Masculinities’ (University of Minnesota Press, 2005). He recently served as the Fulbright Research Chair in Globalization and Cultural Studies at the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition at McMaster University, where he completed a draft of his current book project, ‘The Insistence of the Material: Literature in the Age of Biopolitics.’ His contribution to the Forum is drawn from this larger project.

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The Time of the Black Swan

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It has become common in fields from finance to management to urban and environmental planning to accept that we live in a time in which “black swans” are increasingly prevalent: these are events of enormous magnitude that are also outliers; their occurrence defies expectation, falling outside the “normal” range of predictability (9/11 and Hurricane Katrina fall into this category; so does the fall of the Berlin Wall and the invention of the Internet). According to mathematician Nassim Nicholas Taleb who coined the term, the frequency of “black swans” has increased, and can be expected to continue to do so as the result of the “interlocking fragility” characteristic of globalization (2010, 225). Taleb echoes a commonplace in globalization studies: the tighter and more extensive our connectedness, the faster things happen, the more non-linear changes accrue, and the less predictable the future becomes. In this paper I analyze the figure of the black swan with an emphasis on its history, and on the epistemological limits of the worldview that describes it. Drawing on a brief analysis of Indra Sinha’s 2007 novel, Animal’s People, I suggest that postcolonial fiction offers a productive site for more complex, more inclusive, and potentially more progressive ways of imagining the volatile time of globalization.

The black swan is a portentous symbol for the uncertainties that attend living in global “risk” society (Beck 1999). For Taleb (a successful trader who, in Malcolm Gladwell’s words, “turned the inevitability of disaster into an investment strategy” [2001]), we need to cultivate our robustness to negative black swans, and maximize our exposure to positive ones. Capitalism, which “revitaliz[es]” the world, by facilitating opportunities to leverage luck, is, according to Taleb, the best system through which to realize these goals (2010, 222). In addition to business and finance, the idea of the black swan resonates in security discourse, where it assumes the more menacing form of an unpredictable future threat. Liam Stockdale’s contribution to this Forum takes up the political implications of a model of governance in which the indeterminacy of imminent danger legitimates a potentially illimitable extension of sovereign power’s rationale for action. Most infamously, the “Bush doctrine” of pre-emptive war exemplifies “an ongoing attempt to tame a radically uncertain future through anticipatory, before-the-fact interventions in the present”—an attempt that is “premised to a large extent upon the exercise of the imagination in lieu of empirically verifiable knowledge.”

Keeping in mind the political implications Stockdale outlines, I approach the problem of radical uncertainty in globalized culture from the perspective of the “exercise of the imagination” it entails. I am interested, that is, not only in how the problem of uncertainty brings the imagination into play, but also in how imagination constructs the problem of uncertainty. Without denying the reality of uncertainty, as a condition of living systems that is intensified and extended through processes of globalization, I want to consider how its meaning is conditioned by conceptual frames, by images, metaphors, stories. Approaching the problem from this angle means asking questions such as: What
beliefs, values and worldviews structure dominant representations of uncertainty? Where do they come from? Whose interests do they serve? And finally, how might we creatively expand or reconfigure our ideas of the uncertain future in a way that invites a more equitable sharing of its good and bad surprises?

As an embodiment of historically located knowledge and values—a figure of imagination—the black swan is a rich site of analysis. Its salient quality—improbability—derived from the 16th-century British belief, based in antiquity, that swans were by definition white. This belief was shattered by the “discovery” of Australia, where, it was found, black swans had long existed. Thus the story behind Taleb’s theory: black swans are the materialization of what was supposed to be beyond the realm of the possible. At least two elements in this story are significant: first, it points out that what is unthinkable according to one epistemological framework is commonplace in others; second, a critical part of Europe’s colonization of vast areas of the world depended on the capacity and the imperative to translate local materialities into universal knowledge (capitalism, a powerful motive and vehicle for colonialism, involves a related process of abstraction). So: black swans come to signify not as birds, who lived in a specific place and time, but as specters from the future that cannot be known, but must eventually be managed, and, where possible, exploited for profit.

Perhaps in recognition of its awkward baggage, Taleb acknowledges towards the end of his book, and in subsequent discussions, a central weakness in black swan theory, which is the figure of the black swan itself: by giving uncertainty a shape, a body, even, he contradicts its unknowability (2010 xxxi). He also acknowledges as a fatal weakness his reliance in The Black Swan on a mode of storytelling (the book is full of stories, from illustrative anecdotes from his own life to parables of successful and unsuccessful black swan encounters; it’s arguably what makes it such a compelling, while simultaneously irritating, read). The use of stories is a problem, he suggests, because one of the ways we are fooled by randomness is because of our credulity towards narrative. Narrative, he suggests, inevitably simplifies the dimensionality of “raw truth” (2010, 63), imposing on it an arrow of relationship that answers an emotional need for coherence and sense-making.

Looked at from another angle, narrative is the work of mediation, the interface between “raw truth” and human experience—an articulation of the social. Statistical models of reality also constitute a form of mediation, which denies its social quality. Its propensity exhaustively to map the way things are and could be imputes an aura of certainty, even with respect to uncertainty. In the remainder of this paper I’ll consider briefly an alternate arena for thinking about uncertainty: fiction. Literature’s capacity to illuminate non-linear time, complex relations and systems, arguably equips it to represent uncertainty with particular clarity, but in a way that also destabilizes the assumed certainty and stability of the backdrop against which it is defined and evaluated. In contrast to philosophy and math, literature offers figures not of metaphysical, universal (un)certainties but of worldly relations, in which black swans, along with other characters and ideas, are infused with fantasy and anxiety, and deployed in the service of particular constellations of power.
Indra Sinha’s 2007 novel *Animal’s People* offers a vivid depiction of the social and political context of globalization in which surprising events, and technologies for managing them, emerge. The prototypical black swan of 9/11 makes only a brief appearance, via a TV news report, in this story, which is a fictionalization of the 1984 explosion of the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, India.\(^5\) The novel traces the characters’ search for justice, which is held up by, among other things, the company’s claims for the complexity/uncertainty of the long-term health effects of the chemicals that were released (as one doctor helpfully puts it “Those poor people never had a chance. If it had not been the factory it would have been cholera, TB, exhaustion, hunger. They would have died anyway” (2007, 153). Among the many darkly funny events in the novel is the staging, at the US headquarters of the company by executives spooked by 9/11, of a “mock-attack on one of its own factories” by victims of the disaster (Ibid, 282). The police, FBI, fire department and media are all enlisted to participate in this scenario-planning event in order to show, “look, this is how we’ll deal with terrorists” (Ibid, 282). The precautionary principle that did not halt plans to put a pesticide in an urban area springs to life when it comes to the security and well-being of the corporation.\(^6\) The calculus of trade-offs that informs black swan thinking is rooted in neoliberal ideology: the possibility—in fact the inevitability—of catastrophic loss, systemically relegated to the global south or under-developed pockets of the north, is the cost of doing business.

The temporality of globalization, which structures the story in Sinha’s novel, is marked by non-linear change and the proliferation of surprises; however these characteristics do not add up to a uniform global time of uncertainty. Extreme unevenness occurs not just in the distribution of the costs and benefits of randomness, but also in the way uncertainty is understood and navigated. For the American executives of Union Carbide (“the Kampani” in Sinha’s novel), threat to future productivity is envisioned as a singular, potential event, both imagined and contained by simulation strategies. For the victims of the disaster, on the other hand, the future, and time itself, is broken, severed in the events of “that night,” after which “there is no night and day, only a vast hunger through which suns wheel, and moons wane and wax and have no meaning” (2007, 186). Immobilized by illness, and by poverty, “Animal’s people” have no “future time perspective,” to use Charles Furlotte’s phrase—at least not one marked by continuity with the present.

And yet *Animal’s People* is not entirely an unhopeful book: like much postcolonial literature, it depicts a world in which uncertainty is not contained, but dispersed amongst multiple temporal frames and trajectories. Memory, ecological/other-than-human temporalities and utopian imagination all operate in this fiction to populate the landscape of the black swan with a host of alternate myths and materialities. Reading Sinha’s novel, and other postcolonial literary texts, invites us to recognize both the discontinuities and continuities that define the temporality of globalization. And in the spirit

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5 The explosion killed as many as 10,000 people instantly, and sickened up to 60,000, many of whom ended up dying in the ensuing decades.

6 The slowness of justice for the victims vs. the imperative of efficiency that fuelled the operation of the factory—a key node in the Green Revolution—further illustrates the dimensions of inequality in the “chronopolitics” Tony Porter outlines in his paper.
of the movements Petra Rethmann describes in her essay, literature can function as a staging ground for the interruption of the “empty, homogeneous time” of the present (Benjamin 1968) with figures of the still unvanquished dead. In this “untimely” environment, nothing is certain, but a more expansive and inclusive future seems possible.

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The Governance of Time and the Politics of (In)Security

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Some of the most influential theorizing on the subject of globalization has identified the
globalizing process as embodying a marked shift in the relationship between space and time (see, for
example, Bauman 2000, Harvey 1989). In the introduction to their recent edited volume entitled High
Speed Society, Hartmut Rosa and William Scheuerman develop an uniquely compelling take on this
question, arguing that in the face of the dynamic circulations and accelerative forces of a globalized
world, the traditional “anthropological preponderance of space over time” has been “inverted and
ultimately replaced by the dominance of time” (2009, 10). The core premise of this pithily articulated
yet formidably bold claim is that many of the most pressing concerns of the contemporary human
experience can be understood as temporal rather than spatial in nature, as the unfolding of time itself
appears increasingly beyond our control. While perhaps overstating the point to a degree, I believe
Rosa and Scheuerman’s idea provides a compelling departure point for understanding some of the key
dynamics animating the operation of political power in late-modern societies. This is particularly the
case with respect to the post-9/11 politics of (in)security governance, as the latter’s broadly
anticipatory character has served to “reconfigure the politics of space into a politics of time” with
respect to security questions (Kessler 2011, 2181). In this brief essay, I am interested in developing
some preliminary reflections upon what is at stake in this “reconfiguration”. In particular, I consider
how adopting an approach to (in)security governance that prioritizes the governance of time through
pre-emptive action can have potentially deleterious implications for the way political power is
exercised, particularly in the context of liberal democracies. I will thus begin by elaborating upon how
the contemporary governance of (in)security has become increasingly “temporalized” in this way, and
will proceed to argue that the result of this trend has been a concomitant proliferation of what can be
termed, following Agamben, “exceptionalist” forms of governance that demand sustained critical
scrutiny.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the problem of transnational terrorism predictably emerged as the
primary focus in international security circles. Yet the apparently sudden and catastrophically ruptural
nature of the attacks led terrorism to be problematized as a unique sort of threat that was inherently
“unpredictable in occurrence, characteristics and effects” (Anderson 2010, 228)—an archetypical
manifestation of Nicholas Nassem Taleb’s (2007) notion of the “black swan,” discussed at length in
Susie O’Brien’s contribution to this Forum. Such a framing had significant implications for the
politics of security, however, as it rendered conventional security logics—such as deterrence or
containment—largely obsolete, since these are essentially inapplicable in circumstances where the
threat is explicitly defined by its radical incalculability (de Goede 2008, 162). As the global War on
Terror gained momentum, therefore, the global security environment became increasingly understood
in terms reminiscent of Ulrich Beck’s “risk society,” in that established certainties and techniques of control began to appear inadequate in the face of a novel, spatiotemporally “de-bounded” danger (Beck 2002, 41-2). Indeed, haunted by the ultimately unknowable, but apparently ever-present, spectre of the “next attack,” security authorities became “much less certain of whether and when they [were] secure, and how—and to what extent and at what price—security [could] be achieved” (Rasmussen 2004, 382). Consequently, terms such as “extreme uncertainty” and “radical contingency” now pervade contemporary analyses of the global security environment, and “security issues have increasingly been defined in terms of uncertain, potentially catastrophic threats” (Aalberts & Werner 2011, 2191).

A major consequence of these discursive developments has been the widespread adoption of future-oriented security rationalities rooted in the notion of “risk management” (Aradau and van Munster 2008) and premised upon a “logic of pre-emption” (Massumi 2010). Most famously articulated in geopolitical terms through the so-called “Bush Doctrine” of pre-emptive war (Ehrenberg et al. 2010)—but applied in an array of more subtle ways at all levels of the global War on Terror (Amoore & de Goede 2008)—this approach injects an explicitly temporal element into the governance of (in)security by framing the latter as an ongoing attempt to tame a radically uncertain future through anticipatory, before-the-fact interventions in the present. Indeed, since successfully pre-empting any irruption of threat necessarily involves acting explicitly on the future—which in turn implies a certain capacity to act on time—the contemporary global security climate can be understood as characterized by the imperative to govern time itself (Massumi 2010).

This development has a number of important implications; but perhaps the most significant is that a pre-emptive politics of security necessarily implies a very particular mode of governance that modifies the way political authority is exercised in a potentially problematic way—particularly when considered with respect to liberal democracy. To understand how this is so, it must first be recognized that although it is premised upon governing an inherently unknowable future, the idea of pre-emptive security is necessarily operationalized through anticipatory interventions in the present. However, it must also be recognized that such interventions are ultimately conceived and legitimated only in relation to potential catastrophes that may occur if no action is taken. This essential ambiguity is at the core of any future-oriented political rationality, and the upshot is that the epistemic basis for any decision to pre-emptively intervene ends up being established primarily through the exercise of the imagination. In other words, the futures against which pre-emptive decisions are framed necessarily possess no ontological presence apart from their existence in the realm of the imaginary; and it is thus not established empirical fact that forms the primary basis of the decision, but speculative articulations of potential—and potentially dangerous—futures (Aradau and van Munster 2008). Accordingly, the sovereign authorities tasked with making the decisions to intervene are endowed with a radically enhanced decisional subjectivity: not only do they make the final decision to act, but they also must actively construct the primary evidentiary basis for this decision through the exercise of the imagination in relation to the unknown/unknowable future.
These considerations suggest a crucial link between the temporalization of security politics and the prevalence of what Giorgio Agamben terms “exceptional” practices in the ongoing War on Terror. To elaborate, Agamben (2005) sees the so-called “state of exception” as characterized by the presence of a sovereign power that is minimally constrained by normative strictures and is thus free to act in an “exceptional” manner that contravenes the prevailing judicial framework. As the preceding discussion suggests, the governmental logic of pre-emptive security embodies precisely these characteristics, as the imperative to govern the future necessarily vests a minimally circumscribed, life-and-death power in the hands of a sovereign authority that must make determinations of threat which—due to their inherent futurity—cannot be clearly contested or verified within the evidentiary framework of the established juridical order. This enables purely speculative threats, conceived in relation to an imagined future that may or may not come to pass, to be pre-emptively acted upon in the present with veritable impunity. Put more simply, then, the overriding imperative to govern time by precluding the future emergence of even a potential threat enables sovereign authorities to invoke the ever-present spectre of imminent catastrophe to legitimate otherwise illegal interventionary acts.

The targeted killing of the American-born radical Islamic cleric Anwar al-Awlaki on 30 September 2011 provides a useful example here, as the Obama administration defended this manifestly extrajudicial act by claiming that, as an allegedly senior Al-Qaeda figure, al-Awlaki “posed some sort of imminent threat and thus extraordinary measures were justified” (Koring 2011, my emphasis). This incident is particularly instructive in that, not only did it constitute an archetypically “exceptional” act—since the due process-free killing of a US citizen by the government constitutes clear violation of the 5th Amendment protections afforded to all Americans—but the administration sought to legitimate the strike by invoking the sovereign’s putative mandate to tame the uncertain, potentially catastrophic future. Indeed, as the above quotation implies, “extraordinary measures” were deemed legitimate despite the fact that neither the acute nature of the threat posed by al-Awlaki, nor its degree of imminence, could be articulated with any specificity or certainty. Rather, it was a purely imagined future—in which al-Awlaki had played a role in planning a successful attack—that precipitated the exceptional decision to act pre-emptively by way of a lethal drone strike over rural Yemen.

The central point of these brief reflections is that such exceptional modes of governance are part and parcel of what might be referred to as the temporal turn in contemporary security praxis. And while the adoption of a pre-emptive rationality may initially seem appropriate when faced with the potentially catastrophic uncertainty enacted by the spectre of transnational terrorism, we must remain cognizant of the attendant political implications that can be especially problematic for the liberal democratic states that are, perhaps paradoxically, the vanguard practitioners of pre-emptive security. Such a “temporalized” approach to security problems can quite easily descend into a manifestly illiberal paradigm of government if its potential excesses are not properly managed.
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The Relevance of Temporality to Transnational Institutions

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Traditionally conceptions of world order have tended to imagine it either as impossible, due to the persistence of aggressive self-interested states, or as evolving towards a centralized formal arrangement that would look like a world state, or a world government. For much of the twentieth century this dichotomous tension, between anarchy and world government, seemed to fit world events: the United Nations was created, and formal treaties proliferated, including a treaty about treaty-making, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but at the same time powerful states seemed to act without regard to these formal constraints, as with US or Soviet military interventions.

By the 1980s it began to be apparent that this tension between anarchy and centralized formal international institutions was increasingly irrelevant as a way to characterize the development of world order. The pace of treaty making leveled off (Denemark and Hoffmann 2008), almost no new formal international institutions were being created, but anarchy was not increasing: states and other actors seemed increasingly entangled in complex sets of more informal relationships, and concepts like hegemony, international regimes, transnational governance, the network society, Empire, or global governmentality were devised to conceptualize this complexity.7 This complexity seemed to differ in six key ways from earlier world orders: (1) greater reliance on informal or “soft” rules; (2) greater overlap and interconnection among international institutions; (3) a more prominent role for private and civil society institutions; (4) greater use of benchmarking and decentralized implementation; (5) increased concerns about new forms of accountability other than control by member-states; and (6) a proliferation of transnational institutions that cut across the national/international distinction, rather than simply being negotiated between independent and relatively autonomous states.

Many of these changes in governance were seen as related to globalization, conceived primarily as a spatially-oriented phenomenon. Linkages and practices that previously had been contained within national states were extending across borders (Held 1995). Although there was some recognition of the temporal aspects of some of these changes, as signified for instance by those conceiving of them as associated with postmodernity, or by those who emphasized the accelerating pace of capitalism (Harvey 2004), war (der Derian 1990), or mediated communication (Hassan and Purser 2007), there has not been a systematic effort to consider the relevance of temporality to transnational governance.

7 For these concepts see for instance Cox 1983; Kasner 1983; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Castells 1996; Hardt and Negri 2000; Larner and Walters 2004.
It is useful to distinguish five quite different aspects of temporality that are likely to be relevant to transnational governance. These are (1) acceleration; (2) crisis; (3) orientation to the future rather than tradition; (4) path dependence; and (5) the intensified interaction of different temporalities. There are others, and other ways of categorizing different aspects of temporality, but these are some of the most significant, and together they provide a useful starting point for analyzing temporality and transnational governance. I look briefly at each in turn.

With acceleration, formal law and traditional bureaucratic international organizations can be too slow. The UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights took two decades to negotiate and ratify. Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) have identified a shift towards “experimentalist governance”, which is better suited to accelerated times: continually revisable benchmarks and goals are set out, but implementation is not, and best practices are identified from the experimentation that results. However this complexity can also involve mixes of more benign governance mechanisms and violent, oppressive ones, as analyzed by Breu, in his contribution. States of emergency and centralized, extra-legal action of the type discussed in Stockdale’s contribution are an accompanying problematic way to manage temporal acceleration.

Crisis involves a sudden compression of the time available for deliberation and decision making relative to the severity and speed of the problem that needs to be addressed (Rosenthal et al 2001). Recommended solutions include risk mitigation and a decentralized capacity for resilience rather than trying to eradicate crises and engaging in emergency responses when they occur. This shift is evident in the UN’s International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (www.unisdr.org/). However more centralized coordination may also be needed to address some accelerated problems, evident in the revival of the International Monetary Fund’s prominence during the 2008 financial crisis, or the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility in 2010 to address the EU’s debt crisis.

Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and others have argued that we increasingly discipline our conduct with reference to the future, not tradition, as especially evident with the use of risk technologies in financial governance, responses to terrorism, environmental degradation, and many other transnational policy fields. As O’Brien and Stockdale discuss elsewhere in this Forum, risk has many dimensions, including narrative ones that make an uncertain and unknowable future event appear to be visible and amenable to preventative action. Other transnational governance mechanisms are less centrally about risk, but still oriented to the future. These tend to displace the grand historicist ideologies that have played a similar organizing role in the past, but more at the national level. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals illustrate how a broad future-oriented vision can mobilize and discipline conduct at a global scale.

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8 Acceleration has been traced to competitive pressures inherent to capitalism; the personal need to find meaning in the intensity of one’s life on earth rather than an eternal afterlife; and the ability of new technologies and modes of social organization to detach practices from traditional frictions. See for instance Rosa (2009).
However the past does not disappear from transnational governance, as evident especially in the ongoing relevance of path dependence (Pierson 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Customary international law explicitly builds on traditions, and even though this has been increasingly displaced by more complex future-oriented governance mechanisms, these too often display a high degree of path dependence. Transnational networks cannot be continually recreated from scratch: they rely on previous decisions and practices which have rendered some options less feasible. The UN Millennium Development Goals build on the established practices of the UN system and of the expert networks that are involved in defining each of the goals. Similarly, the relatively informal arrangements that governments and firms relied upon to coordinate their responses to the 2008 global financial crisis, such as the G20, the Financial Stability Board, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, had developed incrementally over the previous 25 years (Porter 2011). Memories of the past can also shape transnational politics, as with the creative reinvigoration of the ideal of socialist governance practices that had seemed obsolete and that Rethmann analyzes in her contribution to this Forum.

There are numerous ways that the interaction of different temporalities is relevant to transnational governance. We may identify a similar “chronopolitics” (Wallis 1970). Some issues are “securitized,” shifted into discourses of emergency, precluding discussion and requiring fast action. Others are decelerated by assigning them to bureaucratic processes. Non-governmental organizations and citizens are often left behind highly accelerated elites, and thereby are excluded from governance processes. Micro and macro temporal scales can also interact in ways that less directly reflect intentional strategic action but that help sustain transnational governance. For instance the mix of traditional and neo-liberal temporalities in the transnational household discussed by Zhou work together with larger governance structures such as regimes for regulating the mobility and rights of household members. In the case of the millions of households dependent on domestic female workers who have left their own families in their home countries, their daily temporalities interact with the more enduring temporality of the 2011 United Nations Convention on Domestic Workers, which mandates, for instance, weekly rest of at least 24 consecutive hours (United Nations 2011). Trans-border intra-household financial flows rival other more well-recognized transnational financial flows, such as direct foreign investment or foreign aid (Safri and Graham 2010), and these intra-household flows are sustained both by the distinctive temporalities of the household, and by more commercial or official mechanisms governing remittances.

There is a lot more to be done to conceptualize and investigate the relevance of temporality to transnational governance. In my own research I am especially focusing on the relevance of these five aspects of temporality in the transnational institutions that govern global finance, but there are countless other transnational institutions which could be better understood by devoting attention to their temporal aspects.
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Socialism, Anew? Russia’s New Left, Chevengur and the Re-thinking of Failure

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On June 17, 2011, I attended a late-night poetry reading in Moscow at 10 Miliutinskii Street, not far from metro Chistye Prudy. The reading had been organized by a small circle of friends, all of whom were interested in issues of critical history and philosophy, as well as the practicalities of social organizing. Ostensibly staged to rescue House Number 10 from its imminent fate to turn into Moscow’s next object of gentrification, the poetry reading quickly developed into a forum for discussing alternative political formations in relation to Russia’s consumer-oriented, oligarchic, and top-down democracy. In drawing on the revolutionary writings of Arthur Koestler, Andrei Platonov, and Victor Serge, those who attended were interested in asking not only how democracy in Russia could be conceptualized in a different way, but also what kind of temporal imaginations would be needed to support such alternative conceptualizations? If, as the readings performed at that night suggest, those temporal imaginations harked back to an earlier time, one marked by socialist impulses and utopian dreams, then this was not necessarily so because those present evinced a particular form of “left melancholia” (Brown 2003) or other nostalgic past-fixations, but rather because socialism—be it in its democratic or other non-command formations (Duncombe 2007)—constitutes one political metaphor by which people dream (Dean 2009) and sometimes even live.

In what follows I want to probe the continuing appeal of socialism as a particular temporal formation and imagination a bit further. However, instead of drawing extensively on the contents of the readings, I use them here as my jumping-off point to explore how and why they continue to constitute an affective force in capitalist Russia. Furthermore, instead of situating the event in rather clichéd and also—I would argue—analytically overstated frameworks of resistance, I examine it as one attempt to re-constellate common understandings of socialism as “extinction-event” (Boyer and Yurchak 2010) and failure, and consequently also as one attempt to open up alternative understandings of temporality in relation to (almost) axiomatic and global forms of capitalist time (by which I mean here an increasing inability to imagine something other than what is). In building in particular on Andrei Platonov’s 1938 novel Chevengur, I trace out, very briefly, how the creative arts work to maintain a space outside the hegemony of historical and political assessments of socialism’s failure, and how they can grasp heterotemporality and nonrationalist pasts in ways that a rather homogenous globalized time (because global forms of capitalism often seem to be the only game in town) cannot. Deeply connected with other papers (I am thinking specifically of the work of Susie O’Brien and Rachel Zhou) in its critical concerns with the harmful hegemony of one (assumed) global time, it also seeks to push beyond this framework by working actively against the teleological assumption of one “final time.”
The analytical trajectory that I suggest here draws on my discussions with members of what Ilya Budraitksys and I (n.d), for lack of a better phrase, have called “Russia’s new left:” a multitude of anarchist, anti-fascist, environmental and radical grassroots, innovative Marxist, and social action groups. Much of what I know about this left emerges directly from my discussions with and participation in the Moscow/St. Petersburg Marxist-inspired collective *chtodelat’* (what should be done), as well as interviews and conversations with members of the newly formed *sotsialisticheskoe dvizhenie* (socialist movement), although I have also been talking with many others. In spite of their ideological and strategic differences, what unites all of these groups is the fact that they consider themselves untimely: not in the sense of being outside of time or beyond it, but in the sense of asking questions about the ways in which time gives form to relations of inequality and power and how its denaturalization (or historicization) enables the shattering of those relations. In short, much of their activism and thinking concerns itself with the temporality of political possibility. If this concern puts them into the neighbourhood of the Marx of *zeitwidrig* or *contretemps*, Althusser’s articulation of multiple times and the irreducibility of various levels to a single common history, Ernst Bloch’s (1991) “contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous,” and Walter Benjamin’s (1999) “dialectical image,” then this is the case because—in a way—most of them are concerned with the potential of the incomplete, unfinished, and unrealized.

**Chevengur**

At the event in Moscow, Kyrill Medvedev who is a member of Russia’s “socialist movement” and also a poet read selected passages of the Platonov’s *Chevengur*. Here is a brief summary of the novel.

*Chevengur*, the novel (and place), is set in an endlessly flat landscape strewn with low huts and overgrown with burdocks; the topography, indeed, almost acts as an abstract, mathematical surface on which events unfold all but at random—characters arrive and depart with little causal explanations, like conjectural points on a plane. The loose, episodic plot follows the trail of Dvanov, a typical Platonian innocent, and his friend Kopenkin, who has devoted himself to the bodily resurrection of Rosa Luxemburg and rides a horse named Proletarian Strength. They arrive at Chevengur, where communism has been declared; all productive labour has ceased and the sun has been appointed “worldwide proletarian’ to toil on behalf of the populace. The inhabitants of utopia—having brutally disposed of the bourgeoisie by arranging a “Second Coming” for them—now devote themselves to useless endeavour: moving houses around, making objects with no function, raising handmade monuments to each other. A huddled mass of outcasts—foreshadowing communism’s nightmarish terror—is brought in to populate the town, a first batch of men is followed by skeletal women who are to act as wives or mothers to the revolutionary simpletons. Some collective work eventually resumes. But the novel ends abruptly with the slaughter of the entire town by a detachment of dehumanized cavalry. It is unclear whether these are bandits, White remnants of the October Revolution, or Soviet government troops—and thus it is ultimately unknown whether Platonov intended such an outcome to be inevitable crackdown, chance raid, deserved downfall, or tragic oblivion; or some irresolvable combination of all the above.
Failure

Why was this reading chosen for the Moscow June 2011 evening, and why was it chosen by individuals clearly identified with some of the Marxist strands of Russia’s New Left? What constituted its work, its labour at that night and beyond? In contradistinction to what one might expect from a socialist-inflected reading and group, Chevengur does not offer a rousing narrative of socialist glory or fantastic wish-fulfillment; it offers almost no reference point for a left-wing nostalgia or even a future-oriented critical nostalgia. It does not even offer a positive memory of socialism that then could turn into a weapon. It describes socialism neither in dystopian nor utopian terms, neither as erroneous or completed. Perhaps, what it constitutes at best, is a liminal point between a “real” and “as-if”: the uneasy predicament of “having-been” and what Ernst Bloch (1991) might have called the “not-yet.” An endless possibility forever delayed.

In the end, I think, what the reading and discussion of a work like Chevengur offers, to at least some parts of Russia’s New Left, is a rethinking of the notion of socialism as failure. If at that night you would have talked to Kyrill and others, they probably would have told you that one of the reasons why they chose that novel is that it addresses their own reality and experience of socialism as failure, yet without ever entirely accepting its terms. As everybody knows, the reasons why socialism, Soviet-style, failed are numerous and varied, and there is no time to explicate them here. But what most historical, political, and other social science interpretations share is the assumption that socialism failed because it was fraudulent, deceptive, and “wrong,” and that perhaps it should never have been realized in the first place. Yet Platonov’s attention to the utopian and dystopian perspectives on socialism helps to reveal the political urge to always already posit socialist history in terms of falsity and failure.

On another level, Chevengur makes a more complex point about a failed socialist history and its uses for an untimely or liberatory historiography. It is not merely the case that understanding one history of failure inoculates against others. Rather, Platonov constructs a narrative of failure capable of generating the seeds of its own reversals: utopian dreams of (to use an inelegant word) “unwatched” freedom, built upon playfulness, inconsequentiality, and the absence of active political work (in the Arendtian sense [1993])—the powerful slogans of many utopian dreams, can only precipitate a catalytic disillusionment.

It is in this sense that radically different temporalities to the one in which we find ourselves now work; the sense in which what is unrealized in one moment might yet come to pass, perhaps through a different mode than was originally expected. To be sure, such logic assumes an impossible economy of loss and recovery, an arithmetic that seems unlikely to add up but must if political potentials are not to be falsified. The Russian New Left’s argument may be counter-intuitive to how many of us would characterize “our times,” but it is nevertheless here where creative accounts that offer new and critical perspectives on globalized time can be found.
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HIV/AIDS, Aging and Globalization: New Directions in Time Perspective Work

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Experiences of living with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are complicated by processes of globalization. Armed conflict, human rights abuses, social dislocation, urbanization, and migration propel people into situations of increased risk of disease-transmission, and precarious access to treatment and care (Johnson 2006). This paper offers some preliminary thoughts linking temporality to experiences of HIV in the West, and how these might differ from experiences elsewhere. How do older people living with HIV describe their time perspectives, what social factors influence the construction of time, and how might this be affected by the global character of HIV and AIDS (the acquired immune deficiency syndrome)? Older people living with HIV interviewed eastern Ontario describe their time perspectives as socially constructed by themselves, as well as those around them: their health care providers, people with whom they share close personal relationships and peers. These perspectives are also influenced by one’s location in the larger global system.

First, I offer a brief background about HIV and aging globally. Antiretroviral (ARV) therapies have improved life expectancies for those living with HIV in high-income countries (ART-CC 2008). Aging with HIV embodies a “new paradigm” in how the disease is viewed in the West, now largely characterized by experiences of complex, but manageable chronic illness (Justice et al 2010). About only 4 percent of people living with HIV worldwide live in the West, however; 96 percent live in low- or middle-income countries (LMICs) (WHO and UNAIDS 2011). While disparities in access to treatments exist throughout the global north, this is particularly pronounced in the global south. In North America and Western Europe, life-saving ARV coverage is nearly universal (over 80 percent coverage), compared to 49 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 39 percent in East, South and South-East Asia, and 10 percent in North Africa and the Middle East (WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF 2011). Outcomes differ vastly for people who can access these lifesaving ARV drugs, as evidenced by starkly different mortality rates.

Globally, many people living with HIV/AIDS are in their fifties or older. People over age fifty make up about 15 percent of the over 65,000 people reported to be living with HIV in Canada, and this number is expected to grow (PHAC 2010). Less visible are the number of older people living with HIV in the global south. For instance, the proportion of the 21 million people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa who are over age fifty is quite close to the proportion observed here in Canada (Hontelez et al 2011). Although HIV and old age is largely considered a Western phenomenon because of limited access to ARVs worldwide, older people in LMICs are consistently overlooked, and data on HIV prevalence among people aged fifty and older are not consistently collected internationally. Despite ageist assumptions that older adults are less likely to engage in risky behaviours like un-
protected sex and shared injection drug use, they continue to become newly infected with HIV globally (Arie 2010). While it appears that HIV over age fifty is an issue around the world, older people living with HIV/AIDS in different locations have vastly different storylines and may also perceive time quite differently.

Temporality is an important emerging issue taken up in contemporary gerontology (Baars & Visser 2007). Socially constructed phenomena of a sense of time left in life, or time perspectives, have been measured empirically across age groups (Lang and Carstensen 2002), and have emerged as themes in qualitative research with people living with chronic illnesses (Charmaz 1991). Dorothy Pawluch et al (2005) explores “time work” performed by people living with HIV in southern Ontario, challenging ideas of temporal regularity (Zerubavel 1981). Zhou (2010) provides evidence of “reconstructed” time in the experiences of Chinese people who live with HIV/AIDS, in part related to their perceived lack of future due to uncertainty around access to ARVs. Research is needed to address how temporalities are experienced specifically by older adults living with HIV/AIDS, and how these might vary by location in a world marked by global inequalities.

To explore these ideas, I draw on a research study I conducted with older people living with HIV/AIDS in Ottawa, Canada (Furlotte 2009). Some of the study participants I spoke with reported they have expanded, ambiguous, and limited future time perspectives. For instance, one 62-year-old woman reflected on the longevity she now anticipates, noting that what used to be her community ‘Grief and Bereavement’ support group was, quite unexpectedly, renamed the ‘Survive and Thrive’ group. A 60-year-old participant indicated his belief that his time perspective was ambiguous, stating “I just go with the flow...”, while another 52-year-old man indicated, frankly, “I don’t think that I will live another 5 years.” These participants present perplexingly diverse time perspectives, which seem to be grounded in a strong, personal connection to the present. Some participants reported that multiple social agents influence their time perspectives. One 52-year-old man reported “Every two years all the doctors told me is that I have about two years to live.” Another 67-year-old man recalled overhearing a telephone conversation between his physician and local public health unit: “…the response from the health unit was: Is that guy still alive? And I could hear the doctor say: “Yes, he is sitting right in front of me, doing quite well.”

These data suggest that health care providers can influence one’s social construction of time. In addition, participants discussed how their close personal relationships framed their sense of time; experiences of parenthood and grandparenthood, for instance, added rich meaning and motivation to their lives. Peer support was also reported to influence how participants construct their time perspectives, and shared community beliefs about HIV (like viewing HIV as a chronic, less fatal illness) may also play a role here. Together, these responses reflect the idea that time perspectives are interactionally constituted (Pawluch et al 2005).

These data also make visible a relationship between HIV, time perspective, and globalization. In Rachel Zhou’s study of people living with HIV in China, when participants felt uncertain about access to effective treatments, they focused on re-constructing the present, because there is no
“future” (2010, 316). In contrast, older people in this study were able to think about futures in part because of the availability of ARVs. In other words, people’s differential access to treatments, which is structured by international inequalities, also shape perspectives about futurity and perceived relations between the present and the future.

Several other contributions to this Forum link to my topic. Rachel Zhou focuses on time and transnational caregiving by older adults. Similar to the older adults I interviewed, these voices are also largely marginalized. Zhou’s study identifies the impact of globalization on family processes, and this rich theoretical lens could be applied not only to experiences of older adults infected with HIV, but also to marginalized, caregiving grandparents of AIDS orphans, whose numbers have doubled in the last decade (WHO 2010).

Different storylines of older people living with HIV globally illustrate the “explicitly economic dynamic” of contemporary biopolitics explored in Christopher Breu’s work. In this sense, aging with HIV provides an example of how western “developmentalist logic” (to use Breu’s term) is insufficient to address diverse time perspectives within an inequitable neoliberal system where some people can access life-saving medications while others cannot. Reflecting this, HIV-infection among older adults is, of concern, somewhat unexpected and less visible, especially in global contexts. Exploring HIV/AIDS and aging in these contexts makes visible how global crises are addressed, which contributions by both Tony Porter and Liam Stockdale show as involving different institutional temporalities that may drive globalized processes.

The first case of HIV was reported over thirty years ago. Since this time, ARVs have improved our ability to slow down the progression of HIV to AIDS. Considering the global race toward a vaccine and cure, it may be reasonable to hope that HIV will be eradicated in a shorter amount of time than other pandemics in history (in contrast, pandemics like small pox and malaria spanned centuries and millennia). Due to technological innovation in medicine (heavily influenced by community-led AIDS activism), HIV/AIDS is addressed in a more accelerated manner than previous pandemics; the progress of these innovations occur, however, in a global space in which disparities in access to treatments exist, due in part to trade-related barriers to pharmaceutical access (Wise 2006).

For communities in which generations of loved ones were decimated by AIDS, reaching advanced age was once thought to be impossible; but is now a complex reality for some. Further discussion about perceptions of time may provide insight into the relatively recent phenomenon of growing older with HIV, and how this varies across the world. Future research could also attend to whether gender differences exist in perceived future time perspectives. Similarly, as different cultures may view time quite differently, research needs to address how these differences play into a globalized understanding of time. Global efforts to combat AIDS through universal access to HIV prevention and treatment are key. Better understanding of how temporalities of older people living with HIV/AIDS vary by location, gender and culture in the larger global system will highlight how the interplay of globalization and time occurs not only in an abstract large-scale way, but also in ways that profoundly influence our daily lives. As good care can make us feel more hopeful about treatment (thus, helping
us to envision longer futures), it would also be interesting to see how access to supportive care, free of stigma, relates to future time perspective. The topics raised in the Forum can indeed help to inform the development of methodological approaches to interviewing about time perspectives in qualitative research.

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The Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition was created in January 1998 following the designation of globalization and the human condition as a strategic area of research by the Senate of McMaster University. Subsequently, it was approved as an official research center by the University Planning Committee. The Institute brings together a group of approximately 30 scholars from both the social sciences and humanities. Its mandate includes the following responsibilities:

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- a centre for dialogue between the university and the community on globalization issues
- a promoter and administrator of new graduate programming

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An Interdisciplinary Forum on Time and Globalization

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